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[L. A. No. 25107. In Bank. Feb. 2, 1959.]

LEO D. RAPP, Appellant, v. VERA K. GIBSON et a1.,
Respondents.

)

[1] Public Officers - Compensation - Increasing Compensation.Under Gov. Code, § 53071, suspending the constitutional provision prohibiting increase of an officer's compensation after
his election or during his term of office (Const., art. XI, § 5)
during "time of war" and Gov. Code, § 53070, defining "war"
as that period of time when Congress declares war, or when
the armed forces of the United States are engaged in active
military operations against a foreign power, whether or not
war has been formally declared, and ending one year after
termination of hostilities therein as proclaimed by the President, the presidential proclamations of Jan. 7,1955, declaring
the termination of Korean hostilities and designating Jan. 31,
1955, as the date of termination of combatant activities in the
Korean conflict fulfilled the requirements of the foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions, though the immediate
purpose was to terminate certain veteran benefits, the suspension of the provision prohibiting salary increases terminated
on Jan. 7, 1956, one year after the presidential declaration of
termination of hostilities, and a county salary ordinance of
December 31, 1957, increasing the compensation of incumbent
elective officers of the county did not become dfective until
after their terms expired on January 5, 1959.

[1] See Cal.J'ur.2d, Public Officers, § 174.
Kelt. Dig. Reference: [1] Public OffiCf'TS, § 110(1).
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APPEAL from a judgment. of the Superior Court of Kern
County. Robert. B. Lambert, Judge. Reversed.
Action for declaratory relief to determine effective date
of a county salary ordinance increasing compensation of
incumbent elective officers of county. Judgment for defendants reversed.
Baker, Palmer, Wall & Raymond and Oran W. Palmer
for Appellant.
Vera K. Gibson, Albert E. Burton, Joshua H. Hanks, J.
Perry Brite, Stanley A. Newman, Charles S. Dumble, LeRoy F.
Galyen and Charles H. Shomate, in pro. per., Roy Gargano,
County Counsel (Kern), and Dennis McCarthy, Assistant
County Counsel, for Respondents.
J. F. Coakley, District Attorney (Alameda), Douglas R.
Dunning, Assistant District Attorney, Francis W. Collins,
District Attorney (Contra Costa), Clyde H. Larimer, District
Attorney (GleIm), William B. McKesson, District Attorney
(Los Angeles), Lester J. Gendron, District Attorney (Madera), Leland H. Jordan, County Counsel (Marin), William O. Mackey, District Attorney (Riverside), John B.
Heinrich, County Counsel (Sacramento), Richard W. Dickenson, County Counsel (San Joaquin), H. C. Grundell, District
Attorney (San Luis Obispo), Keith C. Sorenson, District
Attorney (San Mateo), Vern B. Thomas, District Attorney
(Santa Barbara), Spencer M. Williams, County Counsel
(Santa Clara), James M. Shumway, County Counsel (Solano), Richard M. Ramsey. County Counsel (Sonoma), Frederick W. Reyland, Jr., County Counsel (Stanislaus), Scott K.
Carter, District Attorney (Tuolumne), and Roy A. Gustafson,
District Attorney (Ventura), as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, the auditor of Kern County,
brought this action for declaratory relief against all of the
incumbent elective officers of that county' to determine the
effective date of a salary ordinance adopted by the Board of
Supervisors of Kern County on December 31,1957, increasing
the compensation of these officers. The officers contend that
the increase became effective on February I, 1958, as provided
in the ordinance. The auditor contends that the California
Constitution prevents the salary ordinance from becoming
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effective until after defendants' terms of office expire on
January 5, 1959. 1
The Constitution provides that ., the compensation of any
county, to,vnship or municipal officer shall not be increased
after his election or during his term of office, . . . " (art. XI,
§ 5.) This section was amended in 1944 to permit the Legislature to suspend the provision "for any period during which
the United States is eugaged in war and for one year after
the termination of hostilities therein as proclaimed by the
President of the United States." Pursuant to this amendment,
the Legislature suspended the provision during ., time of war"
(Gov. Code, § 53071). "War" is defined in section 53070
of the Government Code as "that period of time commencing:
(a) When Congress declares war; or (b) When the armed
forces of the United States are engaged in active military operations against any foreign power whether or not after war
has been formally declared; . . . and ending one year after
the termination of hostilities therein as proclaimed by the
President of the United States."
The trial court found that beginning in 1950 the armed
forces of the United States were engaged in active military
operations in Korea that constituted ., hostilities" and a
"war" within the meaning of section 53070, subd. (b); that
no proclamation has been issued by the President specifically
terminating these hostilities; and that under section 53071,
the constitutional prohibition against salary increases is still
suspended. The court therefore held that the salary increases
were effective February 1, 1958. Plaintiff contends that the
termination of hostilities in the Korean conflict has been proclaimed by the President and that therefore the salary increases cannot become effective before January 5, 1959, the
('xpiration date of the terms of office during which the salary
ordinance was adopted. We agree with this contention.
[1] On January 7, 1955, a presidential proclamation :fixing the terminal date of eligibility for certain Korean veteran
benefits declared that: "Whereas the armistice between the
United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Korean
People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the
other hand, effective July 27, 1953, has termh~ated hostilities
in said conflict .... " (Pres. Proc. No. 3080, 3 C.F.R. 17.)
of(linan~e Ilro\'idcs that if the provisions of law prohibit the
increases from hecoming effectivc on February 1, 19G8, they should
hecome effertive on January 5, 1959, the date of the expiration of de·
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fenuRnts' terms of office.
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On the same date the President issued Executive Order No.
]0585, relating to income tax exemptions of the armed forces,
ill which he declared that "January 31,1955, is designated llS
the date of termination of combatant activities" in the Korean
conflict. The fact that the immediate purpose of these decla. rations was to terminate certain veteran benefits does not make
. them any the less official public proclamations by the Presi.dent. of the termination of the Korean hostilities. The
President could hardly be expected to make sueh declarations,
unrelated to some specific purpose simply to declare the termination of a formally undeclared war. (See Pye, The Legal
Status of the Korean Hostilities, 45 Geo. L. J. 45, 58-59; 27
Atty. Gen. Op. 295.) The United States Court of Military
Appeals, relying on the foregoing presidential declarations, I
has held that for purposes of the military code the hostilities
in the Korean conflict were at an end brfore June 4, 1955:,
" [T]aking into consideration all the circumstances existing!
on June 4, 1955, the date the offense in this case was committed, the inescapable conclusion is that a 'time of war'
condition has ended." (United States v. Sa1Idm'S, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
21, 21 C.M.R. 147, 148.)
Since the presidential declarations of January 7, 1955,
fulfilled the requirements of article XI, section 5 of the
Constitution and sections 53070-53071 of the Government
Code, the suspension of the provision prohibiting salary increases terminated on January 7, 1956, one year after the
presidential declaration of termination of hostilities. It follows that the salary ordinance of December 31, 1957, did not
become effective until after defendants' terms of office expired
on January 5,1959.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.

